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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
F. B. SCHICIC and ~fARY EVE
SCHICK, his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
vs.

Case No. 9246

J. If. PERRY and ~IARIAN PERRY.
his wife,
Defendants and Respondents.

STATE~1:El~T

OF FA·CTS

The following facts "\vere ornitted by plaintiffs from
their statement:
This action was cornn1eneed by plaintiffs to secure
a permanent injunction to prevent the defendants from
constructing housing for their horses. (R. 64)
The action is directed against defendants, irrespective of the fact that at the time the action was initiated
horses were kept and maintained at not less than six
of the twenty residences then occupied in the Cottonwood
Glade Subdivision. (R. 366) Plaintiffs have determined
to discriminate against the defendants and have selected
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the1n as the ones who cannot have horses and barn, while
sp-ecifically plaintiffs have for years consented to and do
now consent and acquiesce in three of their contiguous
neighbors housing and maintaining horses on their lots.
Plaintiff admitted on cross-exarnination that he told
Harry Forsey and William Bowerbank that he would
make no objection to their horses or buildings. (R. 208,
210) For a description of the horses and buildings maintained by neighbors in the area contiguous to plaintiffs'
lot, the Court's attenton is invited to the testimony of
William Bowerbank, a member of the legal profession,
(R. 240) John Hoggan (R. 253) and Harry Forsey
(R. 264).
Appellants even tried to persuade others in the ·subdivision to join in their prosecution of this action but
without success. Plaintiffs tried to have added to their
complaint the names of tw"o persons, and finally named
as plaintiffs "Nelson'' and "Overlade", but these parties
were dismissed fron1 the acton. (R. :29, 360) Irvin T.
Nelson, when asked (R. 360): "So, if your name \Yas
added it \vas without your per1nission ~ ", flatly replied:
"That is correct."
Cottonwood Glade is located in the suburban area
of Salt Lake Cit~~. It is in the Cotton\Yood area approximately ten n1iles fron1 do":rn-to\Yn Salt Lake, extending
East fro1n Highland Drive at about 5700 South. (Ex. 10)
The adjacent property to Cotton\\Tood Glade is O\\~ed
In large tracts, the o\vners of "Thich have barns and
horses. ( R. 371)
2
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The only testimony in the case concerning the effect
on the value of real property of Cottonwood Glade \vith
the right to house and maintain horses \vas that such
housing and maintaining of horses \vould add to the
value of the property. (R. 37 4)
The property was recently zoned under the Planning
Board of Salt Lake County and by express provision
Cottonwood Glade Subdivision was included in an area
permitting not to exceed four horses per lot. (R. 300, 345)
No complaint is made that the building now constructed, completed and housing the horses of defendants
(R. 122) is not in good taste and in conforn1ity \vith the
neighborhood and in this regard the trial court expressly
has found the building to be attractive in design and in
conforn1ity with defendants' residence. (Finding V;
R. 131)
The building restrictions expressly per1nit animals as
pets or hobbies and expressly permit housing for such.
(See Par. 5 of Exhibit 1.) The restrictions expressly
permit livestock to be n1aintained on the property so long
as they are not kept for commercial purposes.
Defendants have t\\ 0 blooded horses \vhich are gaited
7

and used by defendants for the pleasure of horseback
riding and also as sho\v horses. The defendants participate in the various sho\vs in the West competing for
trophies. The horses and the showing and riding of them
is a hobby of defendants, and this activity has no con1mercial purpose \vhatsoever. (R. 305, 339)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
NO APPROVAL BY A BUILDING COMMITTEE WAS
REQUIRED BEFORE CONSTRUCTION AS THE PROVISIONS FOR A . BUILDING ·COMMITTEE EXPIRED JANUARY 1, 1955, AND THE COMMITTEE WAS NOT REESTABLISHED.
POINT II.
THE RESTRI·CTIVE COVENANTS ARE INTERPRETED
AND CONSTRUED ONLY AFTER GIVING CONSIDERATION
TO THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT CREATING THE RESTRICTIONS.
(a)

ANY DOUBTS WILL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR
OF 'THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PRO·PERTY.

(b)

RESTRICTIONS WILL NOT BE ENLARGED BY
·CONSTRUCTION NOR AIDED BY IMPLICATION.

(c)

A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION WILL BE APPLIED
FOR BROADER PRIVILEGES IN CASE OF DOUBT.

(d)

A COVENANT WHICH BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
TERMS PERl\i!TS CERTAIN USES NECESSARILY
PERMITS WHATEVER IS ·CUSTOMARY AND
NE·CESSARILY INCIDENTAL THERETO.
POINT III.

PLAINrriFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AGAINST ONLY THE DEFENDANT WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAVE FOR YEARS .A.CQUIESCED IN AND CONSENTED TO THE SAME ACTS ON THE PART OF NUMEROUS OTHERS OF PLAINTIFFS~ ·CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBORS.

4
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POINT IV.
ATTORNEYS' FEES EXPENDED BY DEFENDANTS IN
DEFEATING BOTH A TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION ARE A PROPER ELEMENT OF DAMAGES
TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN AWARDING
JlJDGMENT FOR DAMAGES ON A PERFORMANCE BOND
FURNISHED TO SECURE THE TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
IN AN ACTION SEEKING A PERMANEN'T INJUN·CTION
AS THE SOLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

ARG1JMENT
POINT I.
NO APPROVAL BY A BUILDING COMMITTEE WAS
REQUIRED BEFORE CONSTRUCTION AS THE PROVISIONS FOR A BUILDING •COMMITTEE EXPIRED JANUARY 1, 1955, AND .THE COMMITTEE WAS NOT REESTABLISHED.

The covenants provide for a building con1rnittee and
further provide that the po,vers and duties of the conlmittee should cease on and after January 1, 1935. There
was no necessity for the defendants to secure permission
of either the lot owners or any purported committee, as
no such com1nittee has been recreated in accordance with
the provisions of the restrictive covenants. Paragraph
3 of said covenants (Exhibit 1) provides in part :
"The po,vers and duties of such committlee
and of its designated representatives shall cease
on and after January 1, 1955. ThereHfter the
approval described in this covenant shall not be
required unless prior to said date, and effective
thereon, a written instrument shall be executed
by the then record owners of a majority of the
lots in the subdivision and duly recorded, ap·pointSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing a representative or representatives who shall
thereafter exercise the same powers previously
exercised by said committee."
By the provisions of Exhibit 2, the plaintiffs seek
to maintain the position that there was a committee recreated and that the failure of defendants to secure the
app-roval of that committee prevented them from proceeding with their building. It is the defendants' contention, first, that the building co1nmittee was ne:ver recreated, and second, that the com1nittee never acted either
favorably or unfavorably; third, that the covenants do
not prevent defendants from proceeding \vithout approval; fourth, that the building \vas in complete harmony
and that there was no basis upon \Vhich defendants should
have sought permission.
Exhibit 2 was signed by many people \vho did not
own any property in Cottonvvood Glade subdivision whatsoever. Signatures of Peglau, Evans, ~Io~~le, Hanson,
etc. are of no validity whatsoever, as they did not own
p-roperty in Cotton\vood Glade.
Exhibit 3 was filed shov.ring the ownership of property
as of December 30 and 31, 1954:, and as of January 1~
1955. Exhibit ~ is dated Dece1nber 30, 1954, a_nd it is
submitted that Exhibit 3 by the certificate of Security
Title Con1pany disclo8es the record o\vners as of Decenlber 30, 1954.
As the restrietive eovenants in tl1e prea1nble expressly provide that they do not apply to Lot 28, there
were therefore 32 lots concerned as of Decen1ber 30, 195-±.
6
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Exhibit 3 discloses that Harold Gloe and Olive Gloe
were the owneTs of Lot 12. Arthur Pratt and Ruth G.
l~ratt were the owners of Lot 8. Arthur Pratt was the
only owner of Lot 2 who signed. In other words, his
wife Ruth G. Pratt did not sign Exhibit 2. Harold H.
Gloe only signed as to Lot 12, and the other owner, being
his wife Olive Gloe, did not sign. The tabulation under
Exhibit 3 showed, therefore, that only the ovvners of
15 out of the 32 lots involved signed the petition. It is
obvious that there were less than a 1najority of the lots
that signed Exhibit 2.
In JJ;J organ v. Sigal, 157 Atl. 412 (Conn.), the
Court was considering the sufficiency of a document
waiving covenants in a situation where such waiver would
be effective when signed by two-thirds of the owners of
lots. In holding that the signature of one of the tenants
in common was not the signature of the owner of the
lot, the Court stated :
"The consent signed by Hendel ~\vas one pertaining to an undivided one-half interest in each
of the lots, subject to partnership equity; and
that the consent of the 'owners' of either of these
lots was not obtained."
In the case of 1J1 erri~tt vs. City of K e~vanee, 51 N.E.
867, the Supreme ~Court of Illinois was considering the
sufficiency of a petition concerned with special improvements under an initiating ordinance requiring the signatures of a majority of the owners of property in the
area to be improved. At Page 869 the Court states:
"Lots abutting thereon were Ov\rned by married
women, and the petition was signed by the husSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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bands of these women in their own names as owners and not as agents of their wives. It also appears that certain lots abutting upon the improvement were owned by several tenants in common, and that the petition was not signed by all
of the tenants in common owning such lots. For
instance, one person, who owned an individual onethird of a lot, signed the petition as the owner of
the whole of it. * * * As the evidence shows that
the petition in this case was not signed by the
owners of a majority of the abutting property,
after excluding the signatures so made by married
men and so rnade by tenants in common, then the
ordinance prepared by the board of local improveInents and submitted to the city council, and which
lies at the basis of this assessment proceeding
was invalid."
Exhibit 2 commences with the state1nent: "Come
now the undersigned record o"\vners of lot". The evidence
shows that Gloe and Pratt signed only their names, and
where Exhibit 3 shows that these tvro 1nen \Yere not
the owners of other than a half interest in the lot, the
owners of that lot had not signed, and such lot cannot
be included. The finding (R. 13) of the trial court was
that Exhibit 2 was not signed by a 1najority of the lot
owners, and also the Court concluded (Conclusion No. 1:
R. 132) that no building connnittee \Yas legally constituted
under the restrictions, and that app.roval of the plan
by a building co1nmittee \Yas no longer required. This is
the only deternlination the Court could make under the
facts and the law.
The purported building committee attempted to be
established by Exhibit 2 consisted of Bagley, Gloe and
8
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Peglau. Harold Gloe, as a 1nember of the committee in
his third party ansvver, alleged that proper housing had
been erected and maintained for many years on lots in
close proociinity to the plaintiffs, but denies that he was
a 1ne1nber of the co1nmittee at the tirne the lot was sold.
That would leave Ed\\Tard l\1. Bagley and Glen C. Peglan
as the only n1embers of the committee. It is obvious that
the com1nittee itself never acted or could have acted in
denying any application of defendants, for Peglau states
(R. 286) that he did not at any time vote to deny the
application. This is the san1e Peglau \vho had previously
granted the request of William Bowerbank for housing
of the Bowerbank horses. (See Ex. 32)
The significant point is that in his letter (Ex. 7)
Bagley makes no objection to the building or its design,
but refers only to the authority of the committee, inferring, therefore, that the com1nittee had no objection to
the structure.
Paragraph 3 of the covenants expressly provides
that in any event if no suit "to enjoin the erection of
such building, or the making of such alteration, had been
conrmenced prior to completion thereof, such approval
will not be required and this covenant will be deemed
to have been fully complied with.''
This is certainly an invitation to any owner to
proceed until halted by suit.
The actual fact is in this case that no committee was
legally constituted and there was certainly no estop~pel
that could be set up against these defendants, preventing
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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them from asserting the fact that there was no legally
constituted committee. The committee, in any event,
could only rule upon the confonnit~ of the structure,
and the evidence and findings of the Court are clear that
the housing is in harmony and no objection has been
made to its design or ap·propriateness.
POINT II.
THE RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS ARE INTERPRETED
AND CONSTRUED ONLY AFTER GIVING CONSIDERATION
TO THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT CREAITING THE RESTRICTIONS.
(a)

ANY DOUBTS WILL BE RESOLVED IN FAVOR
OF 'THE UNRESTRICTED USE OF THE PRO·PERTY.

(b)

RESTRICTIONS WILL NOT BE ENLARGED BY
·CONSTRUCTION NO·R AIDED BY IMPLICATION.

(c)

A LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION WILL BE APPLIED
FOR BROADER PRIVILEGES IN CASE OF DOUBT.

(d)

A COVENANT WHICH BY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
TERMS PERMITS CERTAIN USES NECESSARILY
PERMITS WHATEVER IS ·CUSTOMARY AND
NECESSARILY INCIDENTAL THERETO.

The entire position of plaintiffs has been to isolate
Paragraph 1 of the covenants and ignore all other provisions. It requires no citation of authority for the proposition that the covenants are to be construed after an
examination of the entire instrument and effect given to
every provision of the covenants. In this decision (R.
107) the Court finds that the provisions do not prohibit
the possessing of family animals such as co""", horse, goat,
etc. Paragraph 5 of the restrictions contains the state-

10
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ment that the district is not intended to be divided for
or used for a commercial area, and for this reason livestock and fowls ••tor thi,s purpose" will not be permitted
in the area. ~Certainly, therefore, livestock and fowls,
so long as the same are not used for a commercial
purpose, are permitted in the area. Definitely, as the
Court determined, the restrictions do not prohibit the
usual household pets.
The statement in Paragraph 5, "However, the housing of such pets must be constructed", etc. constitutes
an affirmative statement in these covenants that there
would be housing for the family animals, or the usual
household animals.
As stated by the Court in Sporn v. Overholt, 262
P. (2d) 830:
~'Another

well-settled rule is that covenants
and agreements restricting the free use of property are strictly construed against limitations
upon such use. Such restrictions will not be aided
or extended by implication or enlarged by construction. Doubt will be resolved in favor of the
unrestricted use of property. 14 Am. Jur. Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, 621, Sec. 212."
As household animals are permitted under these
covenants, including horses, and particularly horses as
a hobby, then it is only reasonable that housing be had
for such animals. To remove any doubt, however, the
covenants expressly so stated.
As stated by the New York ·Court in Premi~(;m Poim.t
Park Ass'n. v. Polar Bar, 119 N.E. (2d) 360:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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". . . since the covenant permits the conduct
of the business itself, the conclusion is almost inescapable that it permits whatever is customary
and necessarily incidental thereto.''
It would be unreasonable to adopt the construction
of these restrictions contended for by plaintiffs to the
effeet that you can have your animals on the property,
keep them there twenty-four hours a day, or, as you
like, throughout the year or otherwise, but you cannot
build a structure to house them. As the Trial Court
found, and as the fact in this case, the covenants permit
housing for the animals so long as it is not "unsightly".
No objection has been made to the nature and design
of the barn.
POINT III.
PLAINTIFFS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF AGAINST ONLY ·THE DEFENDANT WHEN PLAINTIFFS HAVE FOR YEARS A·CQUIESCED IN AND CONSENTED TO THE SAME ACTS ON THE PART OF NUMEROUS OTHERS OF PLAINTIFFS' ·CONTIGUOUS NEIGHBORS.

Judge Jeppson determined that nothing in the restrictions prohibited the keeping of the usual household
pets, including horses, on the lots of this subdivision.
He further determined that the covenants "\Yere clear
that housing was intended for such animals and " . .as
permitted if the housing V\ras in keeping "ith the iinprovements in the area; that it V\ras clear there 'vas no objection to the design of the structure and that as it was
in keeping, there could be no legal objection to defendants proceeding with their building. This app·arently
determined the matter as far as Judge Jeppson 'vas

12
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concerned, but there is further reason to sustain the
decision of the Court in the fact that where plaintiff
is surrounded by four neighbors who desire horses and
housing for their horses, he cannot in equity choose only
the defendants and say, I accept the violation of others
lJut I will not permit you to have housing for your
horses. There were many others who kept horses in the
subdivision, but we are referring now only to the group
in the immediate area contiguous to plaintiffs' lot. There
would be Bowerbank, Forsey, Hoggan and the defendants.
Since 1955 Mr. Bowerbank had kept five horses on
his property, with corrals and granary. (R. 240) On
cross-examination plaintiff referred to a conversation
he had with Bowerbank testifying. "I said to hin1 I
thought horses or barns would not be permitted but that
I \Vouldn't have any action against him." (R. 208)
Since 1956 or 1957 Harry Forsey has kept two or
more horses on his property, which has corrals and a
12 x 18 feet plus a lean-to building for the horses, hay
and equipment. (R. 262-3)
At R. 210 plaintiff details his conversation with
Forsey when he told him that he "ranted to be on good
terms with his neighbors and would make no objection
to his buildings or his keeping of horses.
Hoggan, who has the third house south of plaintiff,
has kept horses since 1956 and has a corral and a house
with a lean-to for the storage of food, equipment and a

shelter for the horses. (R. 253)
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The legal principle is stated by the Illinois Supreme
Court in Wallace v. Hoffman, 84 N.E. (2d )654, at Page
659:
"The law is well settled that even where a
general plan is shown the restrictions under the
plan will not be enforced where violations have
been acquiesced in . . .
* * *
"The doctrine of acquiescence which will make
unenforceable an otherwise valid plan of restriction is not based on rudimentary eye-for-eye notions of equity, but upon the proposition that tolerated violations of the restrictions \\rill, over the
course of time, defeat the object of the restriction.
* * *
". . . restrictions which interfere ''Tj_th the
free use of property are not favored in law. . "

Section 561 of the Restatement of the Law, ,,.. olume
5, is helpful:
"Acquiescence by one person in a violation by
another of an obligation arising out of a promise
respecting the use of land disables the one so
acquiescing from enforcing by injunction an obligation of like effect .against a third person when
the acquiescence has the effect of preventing a
realization of the benefit sought to be gained by
the performance of the obligation atte1npted to
be enforced."
By \vay of eo1nment on this rule it is stated:
"Thus 'vhen one person has t"To neighbors
both of \Yhon1 are subject to like obligations not
to build neare-r than a certain distance from a
street and a building by the nearer neighbor up
to the street line is acquiesced in, the like act of

14
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the more distant neighbor cannot be enjoined,
since no benefit will result from the injunction
so long as there is acquiescence in the act of the
nearer neighbor.''
The Forsey lot is across a right-of-way to the west
from plaintiffs' residence. There is an unimp-roved lot
between the tvvo, but from the front of the plaintiff's
lot there is an unobstructed view directly into the corral
and stable and horses kept by Forsey. The Bowerbank
lot is across the street and to the southvv-est of the
plaintiffs' lot, and directly across the street from the
Hoggan property. The other residents maintaining
horses are to the west of plaintiffs' property.
As indicated by the Restatement, acquiescence exists
where there is the intention to tolerate the violation
of an obligation. Though it is the position of defendants
with Judge Jeppson that the restrictive covenants do
not prevent the construction of the housing now erected
by defendants, nevertheless, admitting for the purpose
of argument the contention of plaintiff, equity will not
permit plaintiff to consent to what he clai1ns is a violation on the part of three neighbors and then atte1npt to
enforce a contrary position against the fourth neighbor.
The futility of any benefit arising to plaintiff in
this situation by granting of an injunction is clearly
established, for plaintiff has admitted, as he 1nust, that
the restrictions do permit the keeping of horses on the
lot and on all lots in the subdivision. If the objection
is to the sight of horses or the smell of horses, the plaintiff is not realistic, because the condition 1nust be much
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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worse, much more out of control, if the animals are
unenclosed and roaming over the large lots in this subdivision. If the objection is to the structures other than
residences, then plaintiff is entirely inconsistent in this
objection because the record sho\vs the contiguous lots
to plaintiff have both bath houses, swim1ning pools,
summer cottages, play houses, stables, corrals, tool sheds,
etc., and there can be no benefit to be derived by permitting plaintiff to select the defendants as the only
ones who could not have the benefit of such customary
buildings in a suburban area while plaintiff acquiesced
in many others having such privileges. The manner in
which defendants have kept their horses, the appearance
and design of the structure, the beautification of the
lot from the weed patch at the rear of the lot being
replaced by the improvements is all in the record. The
significant statement is contained in the only evidence on
that matter in the case to the effect that the property
has more value in its rural setting with the right to
have and house horses than it would have without.
~Certainly

the character of this subdivision in permitting the having of horses and housing for horses is
clearly illustrated when the member of the building committee, Harold Gloe, sold to the defendants by ,,~arranty
deed, \vithout limitation as to the keeping and housing
of horses, and as set forth in his third party answer
that the area had developed in p·ern1itting the keeping
and housing of horses.
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POINT IV.
ATTO·RNEYS' FEES EXPENDED BY DEFENDANTS IN
DEFEATING BOTH A TEMPORARY AND PERMANENT
INJUNCTION ARE A PROPER ELEMEN'T OF DAMAGES
TO BE CONSIDERED BY THE COURT IN AWARDING
JUDGMENT FOR DAMAGES ON A PERFORMANCE BOND
FURNISHED TO SECURE THE TEMPO·RARY INJUN·CTION
IN AN ACTION SEEKING A PERMANEN'T INJUN~CTION
AS THE SOLE RELIEF AGAINST DEFENDANTS.

The sole purpose of plaintiffs' action was to secure
a permanent injunction. At the time they filed the action
they secured a temporary restraining order, which was
continued in effect after a hearing pending the final
determination in this case. All action taken by defendants' counsel in the trial and ap·pearances in this litigation were for the purpose of securing relief in connection
'vith the removal not only of the temporary order but
also of the action to make the temporary order permanent. The record discloses one appearance on the n1otion
to bring into court the third party defendants. A cursory
review of the record in this case would clearly indicate
to any Court a proper perspective as to the tin1e involved
in connection with the third p·arty proceeding if it "\Vas
to the effect that a reasonable fee for the services perforined by defendants' attorney 'vas $3,130.00. (R. 345)
The Trial Court specifically found that the sum of
$1,000.00 was a reasonable fee for the services of defendants' attorney in resisting such temporary restraining order and securin.g its removal and dismissal.
It is stated in 28 Am. Jur., at Page 864:
". . . when the sole and only purpose of the
suit is to obtain an injunction, and a temporary
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or interlocutory injunction is issued, counsel fees
paid or incurred in defending the action at the
trial, on the merits, are recoverable as damages
on the injunction bond."
At Pages 861 and 862 of the sa1ne annotation appears
the following:
"
. according to the great weight of authority, counsel fees paid for necessary services
in and about legal proceedings directed to procuring the disposition of an injunction and releasing
the defendant from its restrictions \vhen reasonable in an1ount, are recoverable as dan1ages upon
injunction bonds conditioned in the ordinary terms
to pay such damages as the obligee n1ay sustain
by reason of the issuance of the injunction, and
it is immaterial in such case whether the injunction is dissolved upon motion or upon a final
determination of the case on the merits. The
principle upon which these decisions rest is the
fact that the defendant had been compelled to
employ aid in getting rid of .an injust restriction
imposed upon him by the act of the plaintiff.''
In Lee v. Willman, 230 P. 148, at Page 149, the Court
states:
"It was cornpetent for the trial court from its
own knowledge of the value of such service to fix
the an1ount of the fee."
Certainly the runount of tin1e spent in this action
having been detailed to the Court, Judge Jeppson \Yas
in .an adequate position, and \\ith sufficient lmo,vledge,
to apportion and allocate the fees for the services in
securing the dissolution of the injunction in this case.
The days of trial and the two pre-trial appearances alone
18
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'vould more than adequately support the fees the Court
allowed in this case, \vithout any allocation of time in
intervievving witnesses, preparing pleadings and research. Certainly these are items of which the Court
would take knowledge without specific proof and detail,
especially as this proceeding and the services rendered
all occurred in connection with proceedings conducted in
and before this Third District ·Court.
SUMMARY
The judgment of the District Court is supported by
the law and evidence and the order of this Court should
be entered affirming the same.
Respectfully submitted,

~;~~/~:z~~,Je~-~
W1lford')~I~ Burton

and

Reed H. Richards
Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents
720 Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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